We study a wiretap channel model where the sender has M transmit antennas and there are two groups consisting of J 1 and J 2 receivers respectively. Each receiver has a single antenna. We consider two scenarios. First we consider the compound wiretap model -group 1 constitutes the set of legitimate receivers, all interested in a common message, whereas group 2 is the set of eavesdroppers. We establish new lower and upper bounds on the secure degrees of freedom (d.o.f.). Our lower bound is based on the recently proposed real interference alignment scheme. The upper bound provides the first known example which illustrates that the pairwise upper bound used in earlier works is not tight. The second scenario we study is the compound private broadcast channel. Each group is interested in a message that must be protected from the other group. Upper and lower bounds on the d.o.f. are developed by extending the results on the compound wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
W YNER'S wiretap channel [2] is an information theoretic model for secure communications at the physical layer. In this model, there are three terminals -a sender, a receiver and an eavesdropper. A wiretap code simultaneously meets a reliability constraint with respect to the legitimate receiver and a secrecy constraint with respect to the eavesdropper. In recent times, there has been a significant interest in applying this model to wireless communication systems. Some recent works include secure communications over fading channels [3] - [5] , multi-antenna wiretap channels [6] - [14] and several multi-user extensions of the wiretap channel.
The wiretap channel requires that channel statistics of all the terminals be globally known. This model is justified in applications where the receiver channels are degraded. The wiretap code can be designed for the strongest (worst-case) eavesdropper in the class of all eavesdropper channels. However, in many cases of practical interest, such as in the case of multi-antenna channels, the receivers cannot be ordered in Manuscript received March 07, 2010; revised August 19, 2010 ; accepted January 19, 2011 . Date of current version April 20, 2011 . This work was supported by a Natural Science and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) Discovery Grant. Part of this work was presented at the Information Theory and Applications Workshop (ITA), San Diego, CA, 2010.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIT.2011.2120130 this fashion. There is no natural choice for the "worst-case" eavesdropper and the ordering of the eavesdroppers depends on the transmit directions. Hence, it is natural to study an extension of the wiretap channel that explicitly incorporates the lack of knowledge of the receiver channels, i.e., the compound wiretap channel. This model was recently studied in [3] , [15] , and [16] . The channels of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper take one of finitely many values. Note that this problem is equivalent to broadcasting a common message to multiple intended receivers, one corresponding to each channel state, while keeping the message secure against a collection of noncolluding eavesdroppers. A lower bound on the secrecy capacity is established in [15] . One special case where the optimality of this scheme holds is the deterministic wiretap channel with a single realization of the legitimate receiver. In this case the lower bound coincides with a natural pairwise upper bound on the secrecy capacity. The pairwise bound is obtained as follows. We consider the secrecy capacity associated with one particular pair of legitimate receiver and eavesdropper by ignoring the presence of all other terminals. Clearly this constitutes an upper bound on the capacity. The pairwise upper bound is obtained by selecting the pair with the smallest capacity. The pairwise upper bound was also used in establishing the secrecy capacity in [3] , [4] , and [16] for a class of parallel reversely degraded compound wiretap channels. In each case a new coding scheme is proposed that meets the pairwise upper bound. To the best of our knowledge, no upper bounds, besides the pairwise upper bound, are known for the compound wiretap channel. In this paper we study the multi-input-single-output (MISO) wiretap channel, where both the legitimate receivers and the eavesdroppers channel take one of finitely many states. We develop a new upper bound on secrecy-rate that is tighter than the pairwise upper bound and establishes that in general there is a loss in degrees of freedom (d.o.f.) due to uncertainty of channel state information at the transmitter. In addition we develop new lower bounds that combine the real interference alignment technique recently proposed in [20] - [23] with wiretap code constructions. Our achievable d.o.f. remain constant, independent of the number of states of the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper. In contrast we observe that naive approaches based on time-sharing only achieve vanishing d.o.f. as the number of states increase. We also study an extension of the compound MISO wiretap channel when there are two messages, that we refer to as the compound private broadcast. To our knowledge the private broadcast model is first proposed by Cai and Lam [24] . While [24] only studies the deterministic broadcast channel, more recent works [10] , [25] study a larger class of channels including the discrete memoryless channels and the 0018-9448/$26.00 © 2011 IEEE multi-input-multi-output Gaussian channels. The present paper extends this model to the case when each receiver's channel takes one of finitely many states. Lower and upper bounds on the sum of the secure d.o.f. are developed. While we restrict our analysis to the above mentioned cases, we expect similar techniques to be applicable to other extensions of the wiretap channel such as [26] , [27] , [13] , [14] . Other related works on the compound wiretap channel include [18] , [19] and extensions of this model to multiple access wiretap channels is treated in [32] - [34] . The scenario where the wiretapper channel vector is arbitrary rather than one of finitely many states is considered in, e.g., [30] , [31] . Under this model it is required that the legitimate receiver has either more antennas or a different coherence period compared to the wiretapper for the secrecy d.o.f. to remain positive.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II described the channel model and summarizes the main results in this is paper. In Section III we review the real interference alignment scheme for the scalar point-to-point Gaussian channel. Sections IV and V establish lower and upper bound on the secrecy d.o.f. of the compound wiretap channel. Sections VI and VII develop analogous results for the compound private broadcast channel. Conclusions are provided in Section VIII.
II. MAIN RESULTS
The channel model consists of one transmitter with antennas and two receivers each with one antenna. We further assume that the channels coefficient vectors of the two receivers belong to a finite set i.e., (1) It is assumed that each receiver knows its own channel realization whereas the remaining terminals are only aware of the sets and . Furthermore we assume that the channel coefficients remain fixed for the entire duration of communication. In our analysis of lower and upper bounds, we make one of the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1:
The channel vectors as well as are each drawn from a real valued continuous distribution.
Assumption 2: Any collection of (or fewer) vectors in be linearly independent. We note that assumption 1 almost surely implies assumption 2 and in this sense it is stronger. The first assumption is used in the analysis of the lower bound whereas the second assumption is used in the analysis of the upper bound.
The resulting channel model can be expressed as (2) where the channel input vector is required to satisfy the average power constraint , the additive noise variables and are i.i.d. and distributed .
In the remainder of this section we separately consider two cases: the compound wiretap channel and the compound private broadcast channel. The maximum attainable value of is the secrecy d.o.f. of the compound wiretap channel.
A. Compound Wiretap Channel
We develop the following lower and upper bounds on the secure d.o.f..
Theorem 1:
Under assumption 1, the following secure d.o.f. are achievable for the compound wiretap channel for all channel coefficient vectors, except a set of measure zero , .
(
The lower bound, for the case , is achieved by combining real-interference alignment with a wiretap code construction. We can interpret the resulting d.o.f. as follows. By using interference alignment, the transmitter chooses signaling dimensions such that at each eavesdropper, the received signal dimensions are reduced by a factor of approximately , whereas each intended receiver incurs no loss in the received signal dimensions. A wiretap code can then be designed to take advantage of this discrepancy to achieve d.o.f.. The performance significantly improves upon time-sharing based lower bounds stated here.
Proposition 1:
A scheme that combines time-sharing and noise transmission achieves the following d.o.f.
It should be noted that the interference alignment scheme used in Theorem 1 cannot be applied to certain channel vectors, whose set is of measure zero. In particular, it is necessary that the channel gain coefficients be rationally independent. 1 When the channel gains do not satisfy this assumption it may still be possible to attain higher d.o.f. than Prop. 1. While we do not fully explore this situation, we provide a particular multi-level coding scheme for the following example. A new upper bound is derived in the proof of Theorem 2 by considering the constraints imposed due to secrecy and common message transmission. As we show below, the single-letter upper bounds in earlier works only yield 1 d.o.f. In particular, the pairwise upper bound on the secrecy capacity is (8) This bound can be interpreted as follows: consider receiver and eavesdropper . An upper bound on the secrecy capacity, in absence of all other terminals, is . Minimizing over all such pairs results in the upper bound. 2 To the best of our knowledge this upper bound has been shown to be tight in some special cases [3] , [15] , [16] . channel gains are analogous to linearly independent channel vectors in interference alignment schemes. 2 The above argument actually only results in min max I( ; j ). To be able to switch the order of the min and max we need to use the fact that the expression I( ; j ) is concave in p . See, e.g., [3] .
To improve the pairwise upper bound in (8) one can incorporate the fact that each receiver wants a common message, i.e. (9) however it can easily be verified that this potentially tighter bound also yields 1 d.o.f.
Instead of applying the single-letter bounds above in Theorem 2 we start with the multi-letter characterization and carefully combine the associated constraints to get the proposed upper bound. We sketch the main steps below.
First, via the secrecy constraint, we show that (10) where one can interpret the first term as the received signal at an enhanced user who observed all whereas the second term corresponds to the observation at an "average eavesdropper." Thus for the rate to be large, we need either the joint entropy of the eavesdropper observations to be small or the joint entropy of the legitimate receivers to be large. Next we show that the joint entropy of cannot be too small compared to the joint entropy of . Recall that with and , both and constitute a basis of . Using this property we show that (11) where is a constant that does not depend on . Combining (10) and (11) we can deduce that (12) where . It thus follows that for the rate to be large, the joint entropy of must be large. However since a common message needs to be delivered to each of the receivers, the outputs need to be sufficiently correlated. In particular we show that (13) Equations (12) and (13) illustrate the tension between the secrecy and common message transmission constraint. For (12) to be large we need the output sequences to be as independent as possible. However the common message constraint penalizes such independence. Our upper bound in Theorem 2 exploits this tension. A complete proof appears in Section V.
B. Compound Private Broadcast
An encoder for the compound private broadcast channel maps a message pair , distributed uniformly and independently over sets of size and , respectively, to the channel input sequence . The decoders in group 1 produces a message estimate while the decoders in group 2 produce a message estimate . A rate pair is achievable if there exist a sequence of encoder and decoders of such that as and and for each and . The set of all achievable rate pairs under these constraints constitutes the capacity region.
Of particular interest is the sum secrecy degrees of freedom (d.o.f.). We say that is achievable if there exists a sequence of achievable rate pairs , indexed by power , such that (14) The maximum attainable value of is the sum-secrecy d.o.f. of the compound private broadcast channel.
We develop the following lower and upper bounds on the sum-secrecy d.o.f.. 
A proof provided in Section VII extends the techniques in the proof of Theorem 2.
Remark 1: Throughout this paper we assume the channels to be real valued. However we do not expect the results to be different for complex valued coefficients. In particular, the upper bounds in Theorem 2 and 4 immediately extend to the complex channel coefficients. However to extend the lower bounds in Theorem 1 and 3, a complex field analog of the techniques in [20] and [21] is necessary.
III. BACKGROUND: REAL INTERFERENCE ALIGNMENT
In this section we review the main results of real interference alignment from [20] , [21] . We begin by describing this scheme for a point-to-point real scalar Gaussian channel. (17) where the input satisfies a power constraint and the additive noise is Gaussian.
A. Uncoded Transmission
We begin by consider a particular scaling of the constellation parameters in uncoded transmission which generalizes to the interference alignment scheme. Assume that the input symbols are drawn from a PAM constellation (18) Two quantities associated with this constellation are the minimum distance and the rate. In particular governs the error probability according to (19) while the rate is given by (20) Furthermore the choice of and must satisfy the average power constraint (21) For any , let and . Since (22) observe that the error probability can be made sufficiently small by selecting large enough and furthermore the rate can be made arbitrarily close to the Shannon limit in this regime by selecting sufficiently small.
B. Real Interference Alignment
The idea behind real interference alignment is to have multiple PAM constellation symbols instead of a single symbol (18) and thus convert the channel into a multi-input-single-output channel. In particular, consider a constellation (23) and suppose a total of points are drawn independently from this constellation. The transmit symbol is of the form
where are rationally independent constants. As shown in Fig. 2 , while the transmit constellation is given by in (23) and consists of points, the receiver constellation consists of all points specified in (24) i.e.
Interestingly, for each and all vectors , except a set of measure zero, an appropriate scaling of constellation parameters exists that simultaneously achieves a vanishingly small error probability and a rate arbitrarily close to the Shannon Capacity. The linear precoder V guarantees that while each legitimate receiver can decode all the four messages, each eavesdropper can only obtain two integer linear combinations of the messages (and no other information about the messages), thus reducing its signal dimension by a factor of 2. Precoding matrices based on real interference alignment techniques [20] , [21] enable us to reduce the signal dimension at an arbitrary number of eavesdroppers by a factor of , thereby Proposition 3: [20] , [21] The following choice of scaling parameters: (26) satisfies and furthermore for all values of , except a set of measure zero, we have that (27) where that can depend on but does not depend on . The proof of Prop. 3 involves bounding the minimum distance of and we refer the reader to [20] and [21] .
C. Precoding Matrix in Interference Alignment
While the approach of multiple constellation points does not provide any gains over using a single PAM constellation (18) in the point-to-point case, the flexibility in choosing any vector consisting of rationally independent elements, can be useful to reduce the fractional d.o.f. at any number of undesired or interfered users [20] - [23] . 3 The following proposition will be useful in the sequel. 3 It should be noted that the upper bounding technique in [22] , [23] is based on a single-letter expression and does not seem to carry over the present problem.
Proposition 4:
Consider two groups consisting of and users whose channels are given by (28) Assume that all the elements of the vectors are rationally independent. For each and there exists a linear precoding matrix such that the choice reduces the channel (28) to (29) where the elements of are rationally independent for each , and the matrices for have entries that are either 0 or 1 and each row has no more than ones.
Remark 2:
Intuitively through an appropriate choice of , the legitimate receiver observes all the information symbols through rationally independent channel gains as assumed in (24). Hence Prop. 3 can be applied to bound the error probability. Furthermore each user in the second group only observes a total of combinations of information symbols through the vector . By selecting sufficiently large, we can make arbitrarily close to 1, thus achieving only fractional d.o.f. at each user in the second group. Proof: (Proposition 4) We begin by defining a sets (30) 
where denotes the channel gain between the th transmitter antenna and the th user in group 2. Each selection of the tuple results in a different element of and there are a total of elements in and likewise elements in . Let consists of all elements in the set and define
With the choice of in (32) , from direct substitution of ,
Since the elements are rationally independent, the elements of are rationally independent and independent of it follows that all the elements of are rationally independent. Similarly we have that (34) where (35) is a length vector whose elements belong to the set in (31) . Since all elements of belong to we can also express (36) where is a vector consisting of all the elements in and is a matrix for which every column has exactly one element that equals 1, and the remaining elements are zero.
It remains to establish that each row in cannot have more than elements that equal 1. Consider row 1 in . If the elements in columns equal 1 then it follows that . Thus to upper bound the number of ones in any given row, we count the number of elements in the vector in (35) that can be identical. Since each element in is distinct it follows that no two elements of the vector can be identical. Thus no more than elements in can be identical, completing the claim.
IV. COMPOUND WIRETAP CHANNEL: LOWER BOUNDS
In this section we develop the lower bounds on the secure d.o.f. for the compound wiretap channel.
In Sections IV-B and IV-C we provide the proof of Theorem 1 for the case when and , respectively. Section IV-D provides a proof of Prop. 2.
For the proof of Theorem 1 our approach is to evaluate the following lower bound on the secrecy capacity for a specific input distribution.
Proposition 5: [15] An achievable secrecy rate for the compound wiretap channel model (2) is (37) for a choice of random variables such that is satisfied.
A. Proof of Theorem 1:
When either or we achieve full 1 d.o.f. through a combination of zero-forcing and noise transmission techniques.
When i.e., when the number of eavesdropper states is less than , we zero-force all the eavesdroppers and achieve a rate that scales as . In particular note that the matrix has a rank equal to . Construct a matrix , with orthogonal rows, such that . Furthermore, almost surely, each is linearly independent of the columns of and hence for . The transmitted vector is
where the information vector is a vector of i.i.d Gaussian symbols. Since any information transmitted along rows of will not be seen by any eavesdropper, setting and in (38) 
which scales like since for each and for .
B. Proof of Theorem 1:
We evaluate (37) for the following choice of parameters:
where is a vector whose entries are sampled independently and uniformly from a PAM constellation (49) where the parameters are chosen according to (50) where is a normalizing constant, and the matrix is stated in (32) 
where (55) follows from the fact that is a deterministic function of , while (56) from the fact that conditioning reduces the entropy and finally (57) from the fact that each row of has at-most elements equal to 1 and the remaining elements equal to zero as stated in Prop. 4 and hence the support of is and (58) follows by substituting the value of in (50). Observe that is a constant that does not depend on and substituting (59) where is a term that goes to zero as . Finally substituting (52), (54), and (59) in (51) we have that (60) which can be made arbitrarily close to , by selecting sufficiently large and sufficiently close to zero.
C. Proof of Prop. 2
The achievabilty scheme in this example employs a multilevel coding scheme. We first propose a coding scheme for a linear deterministic channel over and then extend it to the Gaussian case using multi-level coding.
1) Coding Over a Deterministic Channel:
Proposition 6: Consider a linear deterministic channel over with two input symbols and and with output symbols described as follows:
where the addition and subtraction is defined over the group in . Then we can achieve a secrecy rate of b/s for this channel.
Proof:
The key idea behind the proof is to enable the legitimate receivers to take advantage of the field in decoding while we limit the observation of the eavesdroppers to binary valued symbols. The wiretap code is illustrated here (62)
When message bit 0 needs to be transmitted the sender selects one of the two tuples and at random and transmit the corresponding value of . Likewise when bit 1 needs to be transmitted one of the two tuples and will be transmitted. Note that when is transmitted while whereas when we have that and . It can be readily verified that each receiver is able to recover either message. Assuming that the messages are equally likely, it can also be readily verified that the message bit is independent of both and and thus the secrecy condition with respect to each eavesdropper is satisfied.
2) Multi-Level Coding Scheme: Fix integers and
with the following properties: is the smallest integer such that for a given , where denotes the error event (63) and is the largest integer such that . We construct a multi-level code with a rate of information bits and error probability at-most .
Let the information bits be represented by the vector . For each , we map the bit into symbols according to the code construction in (62). The transmitted symbols are given by (64) and the received symbols at the two receivers can be expressed as 
where we have used the fact that since each term in the summation is an integer multiple of . Thus by computing (67) it is possible to retrieve (assuming the error event does not happen). Since there is no carry over across levels we in turn retrieve at each receiver. Then applying the same decoding scheme as in Prop. 6 at each level, each receiver can recover the underlying bits . If however we have that , then the above analysis leading to (69) fails and an error is declared. Since is selected to be sufficiently large, this event happens with a probability that is less than .
In order to complete the analysis it remains to show that . We first enhance each eavesdropper by removing the noise variable in (61) i.e., for . Now consider where the last relation follows from since we use the code construction in (62) in mapping . The resulting d.o.f. achieved by the multi-level code is given by
where as .
V. COMPOUND WIRETAP CHANNEL: UPPER BOUND
In this section provide a proof of Theorem 2. We use the convenient notation where the transmit vectors and received symbols are concatenated together, i.e., and likewise , , etc. In this notation the channel can be expressed as (73) Note that it suffices to consider the case when in Theorem 2. Otherwise the upper bound equals 1, which continues to hold even in absence of secrecy constraints.
Secondly we will assume that in deriving the upper bound. In all other cases, it is clear that the upper bound continues to hold as we only reduce the number of states.
For any code there exists a sequence that approaches zero as such that
where (74) is a consequence of the secrecy constraint whereas (75) is a consequence of Fano's inequality applied to receiver . The proof is rather long and hence divided into the following subsections.
Upper Bound From Secrecy Constraint: Lemma 1: The rate of any compound wiretap code is upper bounded by the following expression:
where is a constant that does not depend on .
The proof of Lemma 1 follows by considering the secrecy constraint between each receiver and eavesdropper. A proof is provided in Appendix B.
Using (76) where and are constants that do not depend on . Here (78) follows from the fact that conditioning reduced differential entropy and (79) follows from (80) where is a constant that does not depend on as shown in Appendix C.
Upper Bound From Multi-Cast Constraint:
We obtain the following upper bound on the joint entropy Lemma 2:
Proof: Our upper bound derivation uses the fact that the same message must be delivered to all the receivers and hence the output at the receivers must be sufficiently correlated. Note that
where (82) and (84) follow from the fact that since the message is uniformly distributed over the set of size , it follows that while (83) is a consequence of the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy.
Combining Secrecy and Multi-Cast Constraints:
In the final step we combine (79) 
VI. COMPOUND PRIVATE BROADCAST: LOWER BOUNDS
In this section we provide a proof for Theorem 3. When the transmitter achieves two d.o.f. by zero-forcing the undesired groups. In particular, it finds two vectors and such that and for and . By transmitting , the effective channels at the two groups are given by (92) Furthermore since, almost surely and , it follows that one degree of freedom is achievable for each of the two groups.
To establish the d.o.f. in the remaining two cases in Theorem 3, we combine the real interference alignment scheme with wiretap coding. In particular we evaluate the following single-letter acheivable rate-pair for specific choice of auxiliary random variables that result from the real-interference alignment scheme. 
and . The proof of Prop. 7 is presented in Appendix E. 4 The constraint on independence on and can be potentially relaxed by Marton Coding as done in [25] for the non compound case. We do not pursue this extension, as the interference alignment scheme only requires and to be independent.
A. Case
We assume without loss of generality that . where the entries of are selected to be rationally independent and independent of all other channel coefficients and the symbols in are also sampled independently and uniformly from the PAM constellation (99).
Substituting the choice of in (95) and following the same line of reasoning as in Prop. 4 the channel model reduces to 
where (109) follows from the fact that since and are independent, we have the Markov chain , and (111) follows from Fano's inequality via (103), and (112) follows from the fact that the entries of are i.i.d. and uniformly distributed over in (99), and (113) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy.
We further simplify the last term in (113) as follows: where we have substituted and in the last expression. Finally note that the expression (119) can be made arbitrarily close to by choosing sufficiently large and sufficiently close to zero.
B. Case

When
, we need to do signal alignment to both groups of users. Let . We design our scheme assuming . Clearly this coding scheme can also be used in the original case. We define (120) where the vectors consist of information symbols for group 1 and 2, respectively. Each entry in these vectors is sampled independently and uniformly from the PAM constellation of the form (126)
Following the line of reasoning in Prop. 4 we can express the resulting channel output symbols at each receiver as follows:
where the vectors consist of all elements belonging to the sets and respectively. The elements of vector are rationally independent and independent of the elements of and likewise the elements of are rationally independent and independent of the elements of . The matrices have elements that take values of either 0 or 1 and there are no more than elements whose value equals 1 in any given row of these matrices.
Following Prop. 3 the following choice of parameters with (128) guarantees that for all channel vectors, except a set of measure zero, we have that
where is a constant that depends on the channel vector coefficients, but does not depend on .
To compute the achievable rate pair we substitute in (93), , and as specified in (125). Following analogous calculations that lead to (117) In terms of future work it will be interesting to close the gap between the upper and lower bounds. Also of interest is the achievable rates in the nonasymptotic signal-to-noise ratio regime. It should also be mentioned that the key modelling assumptions in this work are (a) there are finitely many eavesdropper channel vectors and (b) any collection of channel vectors of either the legitimate receivers or the eavesdroppers is required to be linearly independent. This enables us to achieve a nonvanishing secrecy d.o.f. even as the number of eavesdropper vectors becomes unbounded. Instead if we take a more conservative approach and assume that the eavesdropper's channel vector can be arbitrary and in particular may equal the channel vector of a legitimate user the pairwise upper bound yields zero secure d.o.f.. It is naturally of interest to explore problems between the two extremes. Finally there has been a growing interest in designing practical interference alignment techniques based on reconfigurable antennas systems [28] . The role of reconfigurable antennas in physical layer security is yet another promising topic for future research.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROP. 1
It suffices to consider the case when , since the other case is covered in Theorem 1. We separately show how to attain and d.o.f..
1) Attaining
Degrees of Freedom: Our coding scheme is described as follows. 1) Let denote all possible subsets of users of size . We label these subsets as . Note that each user belongs to subsets. 2) Let be a sufficiently large integer. A message consists of information bits where (157) and where is a sufficiently large constant, (which will be specified later) that does not grow with . The message is mapped into a codeword of a erasure code , i.e., where each symbol consists of information bits. Each receiver retrieves the message provided it observes any symbols. Furthermore as established in [3] suitable wiretap code constructions exist such that provided each of the symbols are individually protected, the overall message remains protected, i.e. where and are unit norm vectors such that and for each and and are information bearing and noise symbols, respectively. Following the analysis leading to (47) we can see that the following rate is achievable:
where is a constant that does not scale with . Furthermore we let in (157) to be (161) 4) With the choice of rate in (157) every user in each subset can decode the message with high probability. Each user will have access to elements of the codeword and hence recover the original message .
Furthermore each individual message is protected from each eavesdropper (162) and hence from (158) it follows that . Since can be made sufficiently small, the secrecy condition is satisfied.
2) Attaining
Degrees of Freedom: Our coding scheme is described as follows. 1) We considers all possible subsets of eavesdroppers and label them as . Note that each eavesdropper belongs to a total of subsets.
2) Consider a parallel noise-less wiretap channel consisting of links, where each link supports a rate , where
and is a sufficiently large constant that will be specified later. Each eavesdropper is absent on a total of links while each legitimate receiver observes all the links. Following the secure network coding scheme in [16] 
where (188) follows from the fact the noise variable is independent of the input , (189) from the variational characterization of eigenvalues (see, e.g., [29] ) and finally (190) follows from the fact that exceeds the sum of the eigenvalues and hence exceeds the largest eigenvalue. 
where is an arbitrary constant and where we have introduced
We start by constructing codebooks (201) We assume that the codewords in belong to the set of strongly typical sequences whereas the codewords in belong to the set . Given messages and the encoder sets , and selects , uniformly from and uniformly from the set . It selects codewords and from and respectively and then transmits generated by passing codewords through the memoryless, fictitious channel . With the choice of and specified in (199) and (200) it can be shown (see, e.g., [25] ), that there exist codebooks and in (201) such that the error probability at each receiver is smaller than any target value. Furthermore receiver in group 2 can decode the index with high probability if it is revealed in addition to . Similarly eavesdropper can decode the index if it is revealed in addition to , i.e.
(202) For such a codebook, we show that for some sequence that approaches zero as , we have that (203) for and . We first show the following: (204) and then extend the argument to show (203) for all and .
(205)
where (205) follows from the fact that conditioning on reduces the entropy, (206) follows from via (202), (207) follows from the fact that is a deterministic function of and hence can be dropped from the conditioning. We separately bound the two terms in (208) (209) where we have used the fact that the codeword is independently selected of in our construction and is uniformly distributed over the set and is specified in (199). To upper bound the second term in (208), since the cascade channel is memoryless
Furthermore for each codebook in the ensemble of typical codebooks we have from the weak law of large numbers that the summation on the right hand side converges to i.e., the mutual information evaluated with the original input distribution. Thus we can write (211) where converges to zero as . Substituting (209) and (211) into (208), we establish the first half of (204). The second half of (204) can be established in an analogous manner.
To establish (203) we provide sufficient side information to enhance each eavesdropper so that it is equivalent to the strongest eavesdropper. Then if the coding scheme guarantees (204) then the messages are also secure from the enhanced eavesdroppers and hence the original eavesdroppers.
Lemma 3:
For each there exists a variable that satisfies such that . Likewise for each there exists a variable that satisfies such that .
Proof: The construction of random variable follows the same approach as in the case of compound wiretap channel [15] . In particular suppose that is a random variable independent of all other variables. Let . Define a new random variable, . Note that and and for the random variable takes on the value of with probability and the value of with probability . Consider the function . It is clear that whereas . Thus there exists a value of such that and the resulting random variable in Lemma 3 is given by . The construction of follows in an analogous manner.
Thus (203) is satisfied for each of the enhanced receivers and hence it holds for each of the original receivers.
